From my Insta-Blogging on the settlement the day it was announced last October:
I would argue that a necessary first step would be modifying the proposed settlement to offer any search engine equal ability to participate on the same terms as Google, with no prejudice to their ability to negotiate better terms if they can.
From the Department of Justice brief filed today:
This risk of market foreclosure would be substantially ameliorated if the Proposed Settlement could be amended to provide some mechanism by which Google’s competitors’ could gain comparable access to orphan works (whatever such access turns out to be assuming the parties negotiate modifications to the settlement)
My Principles and Recommendations, from last November:
My starting point is that the settlement is a good thing.
The DoJ brief:
Because a properly structured settlement agreement in this case offers the potential for important societal benefits, the United States does not want the opportunity or momentum to be lost.
My revised version of Principles and Recommendations, How to Fix the Google Book Search Settlement, published this April:
The proposed settlement in the Google Book Search case should be approved with strings attached.
The DoJ brief:
The United States is heartened that the parties are actively considering modifications of the Proposed Settlement and believes the best result is a negotiated solution that can satisfy the dictates of Rule 23, the copyright law, and the antitrust laws.
My ACS Issue Brief, also from April:
This really is a Google-only deal. Suppose that Yahoo! wants to get into the business. If it starts scanning and gets sued, who’s to say that the plaintiffs—who could, by definition, be almost anyone—would file their suit as a class action, be inclined to settle, and be inclined to settle on terms comparable to those offered by Google? … Without a group of “representative” plaintiffs willing to cooperate with the way that the Authors Guild cooperated with Google, Yahoo! would be in the extremely difficult position of trying to file and settle a declaratory judgment action against a gigantic defendant class.
The DoJ brief:
Google’s competitors are unlikely to be able to obtain comparable rights independently. They would face the same problems — identifying and negotiating with millions of unknown individual rightsholders — that Google is seeking to surmount through the Settlement Proposal. Nor is it reasonable to think that a competitor could enter the market by copying books en masse without permission in the hope of prompting a class action suit that could then be settled on terms comparable to the Proposed Settlement.
Our amicus brief, filed two weeks ago:
It is thus particularly inappropriate for this Court to waive the future claims of the members of the orphan work book copyright owner subclass without a searching examination to ensure that their rights are adequately protected.
The DoJ brief:
Third, the structural safeguards of Rule 23 must be satisfied to ensure that the rights of absent class members are fully protected. This Court should engage in a careful and searching examination of the Proposed Settlement and any revised version that may be submitted.
It’s nice to know that someone out there agrees with me about this settlement. It’s even nicer when that someone is able to take action on it.